Module https_transport_ownership_proof 

HTTPS-transport ownership proof

Produces and verifies the proof bytes carried in an AnnounceV2 from / to an HTTPS server. The bytes are a postcard-encoded [HttpsAcmeProof] containing the announcer’s currently-serving ACME-issued TLS chain — nothing else.

Verification is purely offline:

1. postcard decode (wrong-transport / corrupt bytes fail here),
2. [hashiverse_lib::tools::cert_validation::is_cert_valid] — X.509 path validation against the bundled Mozilla NSS roots plus IP-SAN match.

What V2 guarantees, and what it doesn’t

V2’s only claim is “someone managed to issue a public-CA cert for the announced IP”. That defeats the original target: a server that fails to acquire a cert (no control of port 80/443) can’t construct a valid proof and never enters Kademlia. It does not defeat an attacker who borrows a stranger’s chain — the chain is public, served on every TLS handshake. But any RPC the receiver then sends to the announced IP reaches the real server with the real identity at that IP, and the response-side identity mismatch trips the existing prune path (HashiverseServer::add_potential_peer_to_kademlia + RPC-failure pruning in maintain_kademlia). So the chain-borrowing attack is bounded: an attacker can briefly inject a wrong identity for an IP, and the network self-corrects on the next round-trip.

Structs

HttpsTransportOwnershipProof

Server-side proof object for the HTTPS transport. Holds one handle: a clone of HttpsTransportCertRefresher::base_cert, so every call snapshots the freshest loaded chain without coordinating with the cert refresher’s own loop.